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POLICY BRIEF
German Council on Foreign Relations
Connectivity in  
Eurasia: Geopolitical 
Chances for the EU
As the coronavirus pandemic fuels technological and geopolitical 
competition among the great powers, Europe’s relations with China 
and Russia are facing new challenges and risks. Still, the reconfigu-
ration of power in Eurasia also brings unexpected opportunities for 
European actors in the area of connectivity. To seize them, the EU 
needs to reconcile its aspiration to be a globally accepted “norma-
tive-regulatory” power with both its limited financial means and its 
more assertive attitude to geopolitics. 
 – The EU needs to develop a more transactional approach to China 
and Russia. It should promote its core values whenever possible 
and compete pragmatically by exporting its own technical-regu-
latory norms and standards whenever necessary.
 – Implementing the connectivity strategy adopted by the EU in 
2018 requires action in these key sectors: digital and green tech-
nologies, regional electricity and transport-logistic integration 
in Eurasia, and support for the relocation of supply chains. 
 – In geopolitical terms, priority should be given to a wary reen-
gagement with Russia as well as an active, broader engagement 
in the countries of the Eastern Partnership, which can serve as a 
stepping-stone for expanding Europe’s regulatory framework to 
Central Asia and beyond.
 – As official cooperation with Russia and China will remain diffi-
cult, Europe should foster deeper cooperation at a lower level 
among cities and regions that could be a driver and incubator of 
digital and green connectivity across Eurasia.
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In recent years, Eurasia – the vast space stretch-
ing from Eastern Europe to Central and East Asia 
and from the Baltic Sea to the Indian Ocean – has 
become the crucial geo-economic chessboard of the 
21st century. In this macro region, Russia and China 
have been laying the foundation for an alternative 
post-liberal political and economic order. Now, due 
to the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the Eu-
ropean Union might need to dramatically redefine 
its approach to connectivity across Eurasia in gen-
eral, as well as its relations with China and Russia 
in particular. While this presents new risks for the 
EU, it also opens unexpected opportunities. Depend-
ing on the shape China and Russia will be in at the 
end of this current crisis, the EU can use these op-
portunities to adapt its 2018 connectivity strategy to 
the emerging era, get more space for maneuvering 
in this difficult triangular relationship, and develop 
a new Eurasian dimension for its foreign and trade 
policy based on a more geostrategic approach. 
Please note that the arguments in this paper are 
based on the assumptions that the United States 
will continue to pursue technological decoupling 
from China and the current geopolitical struggle be-
tween the two countries will persist. Although the 
outcome of the November 2020 presidential elec-
tions will be crucial for determining the foreign pol-
icy of the United States and its strategic approach 
to Europe for the next four years, the United States 
will continue to promote a national agenda based on 
geo-economic and geopolitical competition after 
2021. Neither a second Trump administration nor a 
new Biden administration will fundamentally change 
1  The Economist Intelligence Unit, ”The Great Unwinding: COVID-19 and the Regionalisation of Global Supply Chains,” May 2020:  
<http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=covid19-and-the-regionalisation-of-global-supply-chains.
pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=BusinessesandC19> (accessed June 6, 2020). [Please note that this link is only accessible to registered users of the EIU.] 
the isolationist attitude that the country currently 
holds toward China. Also, either administration 
would keep decoupling from Europe – at least in 
the short term. In the case of a Biden administra-
tion, however, a rapprochement with Europe is more 
probable. Still, US conflicts with China could result 
in a limited pragmatic-tactical rapprochement rather 
than the renewal of the transatlantic alliance in order 
to promote a global agenda centered on the enforce-
ment of Western values and technological standards.
THE WORLD AFTER COVID-19: 
THREE MAJOR TRENDS 
IMPACTING EURASIA’S 
CONNECTIVITY AND THE EU 
While the coronavirus pandemic has dramatically re-
shaped the EU’s political priorities for helping mem-
ber states with economic recovery, Brussels should 
remain engaged on the global level and be ready to 
seize some of the emerging opportunities across 
Eurasia. Three broader trends, which could be no-
ticed before the outbreak of COVID-19 but have been 
accelerated and augmented by it, are currently re-
shaping this macro region and will indirectly impact 
the EU’s connectivity strategy there.
First, connectivity across Eurasia will presumably 
be less Sinocentric and less driven by China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI) as supply and value chains 
will be more regionally diversified and localized.1 
Despite this development, China will neither give up 
on the BRI nor reduce its scope. In the long term, Chi-
na will be much more focused on digital, green, high 
value-added, and low-carbon manufacturing. In the 
short- to midterm, however, China’s image as a sup-
plier of critical industrial goods, parts, and compo-
nents will suffer. Domestic economic difficulties have 
already forced Beijing to reassess its investment pri-
orities. Meanwhile, China’s aggressive diplomatic 
attempts to impose its post-pandemic narrative have 
increased skepticism abroad. Together, these factors 
could present a chance to reorganize value and supply 
chains and advance alternative connectivity strategies 
beyond and independently from the BRI and China.
Second, while Russia’s relations with China will re-
tain their strategic character, Russia will also be 
more willing to diversify its economic and diplomatic 
This policy brief is part of the project   “EU-Russia- 
China – Central Asia Strategic Dialogue on Con-
nectivity,” implemented by DGAP in cooperation 
with the Russian International Affairs Coun-
cil (RIAC) and with the support of the German 
Federal Foreign Office. As a follow-up to the 
previous study ”Eurasia: Playing Field or Bat-
tle Field?” (DGAP, August 2019), it incorporates 
input from workshops held in Berlin and Mos-
cow in September and December 2019. The au-
thor would like to thank DGAP Director Daniela 
Schwarzer and Head of the Robert Bosch Center 
Milan Nič for useful comments. 
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relations in Asia and toward Europe as its attitude 
toward China evolves. The coronavirus crisis will not 
change the Kremlin’s general foreign policy attitude 
toward Beijing, nor will it cause Moscow to concede 
much to the EU’s normative model. Moscow will try 
to further prioritize economic, industrial, and geo-
strategic sovereignty – both at the national and re-
gional level. Weakened by the combined effect of 
collapsing oil prices, reduced energy demand in 
Europe, and the economic lockdown, Russia might, 
however, become even more technologically, eco-
nomically, and infrastructurally dependent on China. 
More than in the past, it will probably carefully con-
sider the need to diversify its economic and diplo-
matic relations both within Asia and toward Europe.2 
Amid the coronavirus pandemic, the Russian gov-
ernment is indeed concluding that it is not only los-
ing maneuvering space vis-à-vis Beijing, but also that 
its economic dependence on China – particularly in 
strategic technologies like 5G3 – is growing. Mean-
while, Beijing’s ability to leverage its position and 
technologies is growing as well. 
Third, decoupling production networks at the glob-
al level will lead to recoupling at regional levels and 
competition with China over supply; value chains 
in third markets in Europe, Asia, and Africa will in-
crease. Decoupling the production networks among 
China, the US, and potentially the EU will more like-
ly lead to regional “nearshoring” rather than a sim-
ple renationalization of production. In the long term, 
Europe will no longer be able to disguise its indus-
trial autarchy as strategic autonomy. In fact, growth, 
technological innovation, industrial development, 
green energy generation, and consumer markets 
will still gravitate around the macro region of East-
ern Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific and eventually along 
the nexus of Southeast Asia, India, West Asia, and 
Africa. Competition with China over supply and value 
chains, markets, and technologies, as well as connec-
tivity initiatives, will increase – along with the EU’s 
need to increase external engagement. 
Against this backdrop of a changing Eurasian land-
scape, the EU must adapt the scope, instruments, 
and strategic direction of its connectivity strategy. 
2  Dimitry Trenin, ”How Russia Can Maintain Equilibrium in the Post-Pandemic Bipolar World,” Carnegie Moscow Center, May 1, 2020:  
<https://carnegie.ru/commentary/81702> (accessed June 6, 2020).
3  Alexander Gabuev, “Huawei’s Courtship of Moscow Leaves West in the Cold,” Financial Times, June 21, 2020:  
<https://www.ft.com/content/f36a558f-4e4d-4c00-8252-d8c4be45bde4> (accessed June 21, 2020).
4  European External Action Service, “Connecting Europe and Asia: Building Blocks for an EU Strategy,” September 19, 2018: <https://eeas.europa.eu/
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/50708/connecting-europe-and-asia-building-blocks-eu-strategy_en> (accessed June 6, 2020).
5  Jacopo Pepe, “Eurasia: Playing Field or Battle Field? Defining an Effective German and European Approach on Connectivity Toward China and Russia,” 
DGAP Analysis, July 25, 2019: <https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/eurasia-playing-field-or-battle-field> (accessed May 25, 2020).
THE EU’S EVOLVING APPROACH 
TO EURASIA’S CONNECTIVITY 
The EU Connectivity Strategy of September 2018 was 
an initial and much needed answer to ongoing inte-
gration processes in Eurasia. By confronting China 
– and to a lesser extent, Russia – with an alterna-
tive, sustainable, and inclusive connectivity concept, 
the EU reaffirmed its beliefs in the liberal model as 
an instrument for defining a sustainable global and 
regional order, particularly in this vast and crucial 
macro region.4
Almost two years after its launch, however, the strat-
egy still needs to be brought to life. It is currently 
more accurate to describe it as a technical docu-
ment and list of the EU’s instruments and potential 
cooperation partners than a strategic blueprint for 
action.5 Moreover, the strategy still lacks substantial 
dedicated financial resources. While the new multi- 
annual financial framework (MFF) for 2021 to 2027 
was supposed to identify funds for the connectivity 
strategy, it was completely reworked in the context 
of the European Recovery Fund to support economic 
recovery in member states. The details of the funds 
of the Neighborhood, Development, and Internation-
al Cooperation Instrument are yet to be determined. 
While the pandemic response of “Team Europe” 
specifies that the six Eastern Partnership countries 
will receive extra funds, there is currently no bud-
get allocation from other European Commission pro-
grams targeting the broader Eurasian space. Even in 
The EU’s 2018  
Connectivity Strategy 
still needs to be  
brought to life.
Connectivity in Eurasia: Geopolitical Chances for the EU
4
POLICY BRIEF
No. 18 | September 2020
the European Union’s direct eastern neighborhood, 
where the EU remains a major investor, its finan-
cial means still have only granular distribution and 
coordination. To put things in perspective, the in-
vestments required for the completion of the core 
of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) – 
including its extension to the eastern neighborhood – 
would amount to between 500 million and 1.5 billion 
euro until 2030.6
Already before the outbreak of the coronavirus pan-
demic, the EU had at least started to rethink its ap-
proach to the world. At the end of the Juncker 
Commission, a tougher approach toward China was 
emerging. Moreover, the initial leitmotif of Ursula 
von der Leyen’s European Commission and Josep 
Borrell’s mandate as Commission Vice-President and 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign and 
Security Policy was a more geopolitical Europe. As 
Borrell affirmed in his introduction speech in October 
2019, the EU “needs to learn the language of power.”7 
The EU’s self-image has, therefore, apparently 
evolved from being technical-normative to more 
“geopolitical-regulatory-normative” – an approach 
that aims to combine the power of its regulatory 
framework with the attractiveness of its normative 
and value model. Proclaiming its geopolitical ambi-
tions is doubtless a small yet important step for the 
EU, and kick-starting the implementation of its con-
nectivity strategy has become part of this new nar-
6  European Commission, “Delivering TEN-T: Facts and Figures,” September 2017, p. 5:  
<http://www.connectingeu.eu/documents/Delivering_TEN_T.pdf> (accessed June 16, 2020).
7  David Fernandez, “Josep Borrell: A Realist European Foreign Policy?”, The New Federalist, October 9, 2019:  
<https://www.thenewfederalist.eu/josep-borrell-a-realist-european-foreign-policy?lang=fr> (accessed May 30, 2020).
8  Carole Lecomte, “Ambassador Romana Vlahutin: The EU’s Connectivity Strategy,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, May 10, 2019: 
<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/ambassador-romana-vlahutin-eus-connectivity-strategy> (accessed July 10, 2020).
9   Pepe, “Eurasia: Playing Field or Battle Field?” (see note 5), p. 21.
10  Michael Peel, “EU-Japan Tryst is a Sign of Shifting Geopolitical Times,” Financial Times, May 26, 2020:  
<https://www.ft.com/content/cc9ba993-3da1-481a-947f-8e691e0f0f98> (accessed May 26, 2020).
rative. Efforts to this end have been made on three 
main fronts, which also represent starting points 
for Europe to redefine its relations with China and 
Russia in the post-COVID-19 era: 
1. Showing greater self-confidence in the power of 
regulatory legal norms and technical standards. 
While this shift in attitude can generally be seen as 
a central element of defining a more geopolitical Eu-
rope, Romana Vlahutin, EU Ambassador at Large for 
Connectivity in the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), also considers it a key asset for implement-
ing global connectivity in line with European values – 
so-called sustainable connectivity.8 
2. Reassessing geographic priorities and harmoniz-
ing political and financial instruments with a focus 
on regional connectivity. Examples include better 
coordinating and aligning TEN-T corridors with the 
Caucasus and Central Asia transport corridors via 
Central Eastern Europe, as well as greater partic-
ipation by the EU and Germany in the Three Seas 
Initiative.9  
3. Developing connectivity partnerships to promote 
norms and standards for sustainable, green, and dig-
ital connectivity with new, like-minded partners be-
yond the transatlantic relationship. The partnership 
on connectivity signed with Japan in September 2019 
is an initial step in this direction.10 
LIMITS OF THE EU’S APPROACH 
TOWARD THE CHINA-RUSSIA  
CHALLENGE
When it comes to shaping its relations with two 
great powers such as Russia and China, the Euro-
pean Union still lacks a more flexible understanding 
of how to reconcile its geopolitical aspirations with 
realistic action. The EU needs to make fluid adjust-
ments to its goals, instruments, and limited financial 
means on its intended journey to becoming a reg-
ulatory standard setter (on which it bases its newly 
declared assertiveness) and a globally, naturally ac-
Through connectivity, 
the EU can start to  
redefine its relations 
with China and Russia. 
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cepted normative power (which defines the essence 
of its value-based liberal model). 
To be sure, the EU should not give up on promoting 
its core values, such as human rights, freedom of the 
press, and data protection. Nor should it stop attach-
ing conditionality when promoting sustainable con-
nectivity across Eurasia. While these values will remain 
essential elements of a more geopolitical Europe, insti-
tutions in Brussels will need to better differentiate be-
tween the need to defend them at home from external 
interference and the wish to establish or enforce them 
abroad with their limited capabilities. 
In fact, China is already becoming a normative power 
throughout Eurasia. It has proven that it is ready to 
set technological and political standards with the BRI 
as well as its Made in China 2025 and China Stan-
dards 2035 initiatives. In addition, it has not been 
shy to promote its “community of shared future for 
the mankind,” a value set in polar opposition to the 
Western-liberal model.
At the same time, Russia’s junior status in its partner-
ship with China, as well as the current impasse in the 
post-Soviet integration project, have not prevented 
Moscow from recognizing the long-term necessity of 
“pivoting to Asia” and trying to find an autonomous 
role in the new Asian century – albeit a more mar-
ginal and less assertive one than Moscow was used 
to playing in a Europe shaped by Western institu-
tions, norms, and values.
Moreover, a common understanding of multilateral-
ism among the three players is lacking11 and both the 
Russian and Chinese governments actively oppose 
the European regulatory framework for Eurasia’s 
connectivity. Consequently, in order to promote 
the European Union’s core values and defend West-
ern multilateralism, Brussels will have to negotiate 
hard and be ready to exploit any possible chance to 
leverage the advantages of the EU’s regulatory and 
market power. It should not, however, assume that 
Moscow and Beijing will either agree to the EU’s nor-
mative terms or necessarily refuse any compromise. 
In a more fluid, geopolitical world, normative values 
also become part of more transactional negotiations.
11  This was one of the main results from the discussion among Chinese, Russian, and European experts during the fourth and final workshop of the project 
“EU-Russia-China – Central Asia Strategic Dialogue on Connectivity,” which took place at the RIAC in Moscow from December 3 to 4, 2019. See also Andrey 
Kortunov, “What is Multilateralism in European Terms?”, RIAC, May 28, 2020:  
<https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/what-is-multilateralism-in-european-terms/> (accessed May 29, 2020).
12  Andrey Kortunov, “Will Russia Return to Europe?”, RIAC, November 6, 2018:  
<https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/will-russia-return-to-europe/> (accessed May 20, 2020).
13  From a confidential input paper on Russia’s strategy in Eurasia written by Ivan Timofeev, Elena Alekseenkova, and Ksenia Kuzmina ahead of the RIAC-
DIFFERENT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
IN MOSCOW AND BEIJING  
Against this backdrop, the EU – although it is cur-
rently both complacent about its normative model 
and unwilling to grasp the transactional and more 
variable nature of the new international system – 
now has a geopolitical chance to exploit the grow-
ing frictions between Moscow and Beijing. Doing 
so would improve Europe’s chances to advance its 
agenda for sustainable connectivity across Eurasia 
by defining common technical and regulatory stan-
dards for trade, transport, and green technology 
value chains. 
In fact, while the Chinese-Russian relationship ap-
pears to be solid, it is based on distinct and asym-
metrical power leverages. It is also complicated by 
differing understandings of the regional, continental, 
and global order, as well as a still unclear conceptu-
alization of each country’s respective role in it. The 
coronavirus pandemic has only added to the growing 
feeling by Russia that China’s technological and eco-
nomic embrace is as much needed as it is increasing-
ly uncomfortable. 
At a time when relations with the United States are 
deteriorating amid an escalating trade war, China 
seems more interested in cooperating with Eu-
rope. This interest will only grow in a post-pandemic 
world. For China, the EU is an essential source of 
technological know-how and end market. China also 
needs the EU to legitimize its actions within the ex-
isting international system and multilateral institu-
tions for as long as possible while it works to create 
parallel, Chinese-dominated governance institutions. 
Russia, on the contrary, is decisively more interested 
in being recognized as a global power by the United 
States than “returning to Europe.”12 As Moscow’s as-
sessment of the complex and increasing asymmet-
rical relationship it has with Beijing becomes more 
critical, however, it also sees revitalizing its econom-
ic and financial relations with single European coun-
tries as a necessary means of hedging its bets with 
China.13 Moscow has recently sent diplomatic signals 
to that end. For example, it lowered the level of dip-
Connectivity in Eurasia: Geopolitical Chances for the EU
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lomatic participation in the recent digital BRI forum 
chaired by China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi.14  
At first glance, Beijing and Moscow still seem unwill-
ing to cooperate with the EU on its normative terms. 
In a world that will be affected by the COVID-19 pan-
demic for the foreseeable future, however, both could 
become more interested in – or forced into – ad hoc 
and flexible cooperation on select issues. Both could 
ultimately be compelled to come to terms with Eu-
rope as a leading setter of technological standards 
and, thus, to the normative conditionality that comes 
with that position.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The initial attempt of Ursula von den Leyen’s Euro-
pean Commission to reposition the EU as a geopo-
litical power – with a global agenda for developing a 
green and digital economy, implementing industrial 
autonomy, and forging new connectivity alliances 
such as the one with Japan – is important and en-
couraging. Given the new realities described above, 
however, the EU can no longer avoid tackling the 
core strategic question of how to approach China 
and Russia. 
Starting with Germany’s presidency of the Council 
of the European Union in the second half of 2020, 
the EU should focus on strengthening the external 
dimension of its green, digital, and industrial strat-
egies, which will prove crucial for their implemen-
tation. With presumably even less resources to be 
dedicated to external action, the EU should con-
centrate on consolidating its efforts – both financial 
and logistical – into  putting its connectivity strate-
gy into action, using it as a catalyst to reach its dig-
ital, green, and industrial goals across Eurasia, Asia, 
and eventually Africa. Given the limited means that it 
has at its disposal, the EU should take action in these 
four directions in order to maximize opportunities 
while balancing expectations: 
First, the European Union should develop a more 
transactional approach to China and Russia. Hence-
forth, the EU should proactively engage Russia and 
China in a dialogue about their respective visions 
DGAP workshop “EU-Russia-China-Central Asia Strategic Dialogue on Connectivity. The Future of Eurasia: Mapping Out Concepts and Practices for a 
Possible EU-Russia-China Cooperation,” which was held in Moscow on December 4, 2019. 
14  Russian Foreign Ministry, Statement for the Press after the BRI Forum [in Russian], June 18, 2020:  
<https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/UdAzvXr89FbD/content/id/4169112> (accessed June 21, 2020).
15  Maria Pastukhova, Jacopo Pepe, Kirsten Westphal, “Beyond the Green Deal: Upgrading the EU’s Energy Diplomacy for a New Era,” SWP-Comments, 
No.31, June 2020: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C31/> (accessed August 16, 2020).
for a future economic, political, and security order 
in Eurasia – while simultaneously reaffirming its own 
commitment to liberal values. Europeans should, 
however, bear in mind that any shared vision for 
Eurasia based on an a priori acceptance of our “uni-
versal values” will not be easy to achieve. Where 
visions digress, the EU should be pragmatic, focus-
ing on the export of its technical-regulatory norms 
and standards in sectors such as green energy and 
connectivity, electricity, industrial digitalization, and 
new low-carbon value chains, for example those in 
the production of hydrogen or battery cells. 
Because of its strong economy and market, the EU 
has leverage when it comes to harmonizing differ-
ent regulatory and normative spaces or establishing 
cross-regional markets and infrastructure networks. 
In the energy and electricity sector, for example, it 
should promote its green agenda less ideological-
ly and more pragmatically by reinforcing the exter-
nal action of such bodies as the European System 
of Network Transmission Operators (ENTSO). The 
EU should also turn them into platforms for dia-
logue, particularly vis-à-vis countries in its immedi-
ate eastern and southeastern neighborhoods – from 
the Baltics to Ukraine and Turkey – that will be or al-
ready are synchronized with the EU’s power grid.15 In 
the transport sector, the external dialogue function 
of bureaucratic bodies, such as the European Union 
Agency for Railways (EUAR), should be strengthened 
along with the creation of a supranational agency for 
the coordination and implementation of TEN_T. 
Establishing an intra-governmental and intra-agency 
dialogue with China and Russia – as well as with oth-
er small and mid-sized powers along the nexus of the 
Baltic, Black, and Caspian Seas – that is targeted for 
each particular sector could help to clarify common 
interests or structural differences. Thus, it could be 
a first step toward achieving the long-term goal of 
creating shared rules for a common playing field in 
these regions. 
Second, given the current reconfiguration of the 
power balance in both Eurasia and the Chinese-Rus-
sian relationship as a consequence of the COVID-19 
pandemic, the EU needs to seize the opportunity to 
reengage Russia on both the bilateral and multilateral 
Connectivity in Eurasia: Geopolitical Chances for the EU
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level, if political circumstances allow. This is likely to 
be a long-term task because it would require not on-
ly a minimal consensus among EU member states, but 
also more willingness by Russia to make concessions 
on the implementation of the Minsk Agreement relat-
ed to the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. Still, by 
reopening a strategic dialogue, both the EU and Rus-
sia could regain maneuvering space vis-à-vis China.
Bilaterally, the EU could approach Russia to discuss 
potential cooperation in advanced industrial produc-
tion, new low-carbon value and supply chains (hy-
drogen), and energy efficiency, with a specific focus 
on the regions of western Russia.16 Because bilater-
al EU-Russia reengagement will not prove sufficient, 
the EU could also explore multilateral and trilater-
al formats for cooperation. The EU Commission’s 
openness for a structured dialogue with the Eurasian 
Economic Union presents one multilateral option.17 
Trilaterally, the EU could discuss expanding its exist-
ing connectivity cooperation with Japan to Russia’s 
Far East and Northeast Asia. It could also kick-start 
a dialogue with Moscow and New Delhi to connect 
planning for the Indo-Pacific with the Great Indian 
Road and the North-South Transport Corridor. 
Third, given the regionalization and decentralization 
tendencies of global value chains and energy markets 
accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU con-
nectivity strategy should be used to help create more 
resilient and diversified supply and value chains. The 
focus should be placed on fewer fields that are cru-
cial to connectivity: digital connectivity, value chains 
related to new low-carbon technologies such as hy-
drogen and renewables, regional electricity grids, 
the integration of intra-regional transport networks, 
and support for the relocation and diversification 
of European supply chains across Eurasia.18 In do-
ing so, the EU should look beyond Russia and China; 
it should keep privileging its direct neighborhood in 
the east but not limit its action to it, expanding its 
radius to Central Asia, Southeast and West Asia, and 
eventually North and East Africa.
Fourth, as direct political cooperation among the 
EU, China, and Russia might remain difficult, the EU 
should also strengthen the transnational and subna-
16  Oliver Hermes, “Построим будущее вместе” [Into the Future Together], Kommersant, June 7, 2020:   
<https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4372593?query=%D0%9E%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%20
%D0%93%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%81> (accessed June 10, 2020).
17  Tony van der Togt, “EU & Eurasian Economic Union: A Common Chinese Challenge,” Clingendael, April 30, 2020:  
<https://www.clingendael.org/publication/eu-eurasian-economic-union-common-chinese-challenge> (accessed May 10, 2020).
18  Romana Vlahutin, “Reconnected: How the EU Can Assert its Sovereignty after the Pandemic,” European Council on Foreign Relations, April 21, 2020: 
<https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_reconnected_how_the_eu_can_assert_its_sovereignty_after_the_pand> (accessed August 16, 2020).
tional dimensions of its action. Ideally, it should use 
the digital dimension of its connectivity strategy as 
an instrument to strengthen inter-city and inter-re-
gional cooperation on urban mobility, smart cities, 
and smart grids. Considering the emerging role cities 
and regions have as both agents of digital and green 
connectivity and incubators of industrial innovation, 
the EU should foster city-to-city and region-to- 
region partnerships with cities and regions across 
Eurasia more decisively.
Under current circumstances, a more holistic, flexi-
ble, and creative-strategic approach to the Chinese 
and Russian challenge – one that is simultaneously 
less normative-ideological – is needed to tackle the 
risks resulting from the coronavirus pandemic. Only 
if the EU can turn its connectivity strategy from an 
unimplementable document into a useful instrument 
and blueprint for action can it seize the significant 
geopolitical opportunities offered in turbulent post-
COVID-19 Eurasia.
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